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In November 1968, Captain Bill Haneke was an 
army infantry officer assigned as an advisor to the Regional 
Forces/Police Forces, or “Ruff Puffs” as the American 
Army nicknamed them in the Bin Thuan Province. He and 
twelve other advisors supervised several hundred Ruff 
Puffs whose mission was to provide protection for the 
South Vietnamese rural villages. The Americans had no 
idea that this undisciplined and poorly trained organization 
was once part of a disciplined French colonial police 
organization. The same type of organization had 
successfully kept French colonial possessions peaceful for 
many decades. Haneke was not a policeman nor did the 
United States have a colonial or constabulary-type police 
force. Instead of constabulary policing, Haneke taught 
infantry tactics he learned from Ranger school, including 
“field cooking” a chicken.1 The camp was continually 
under observation from the Viet Cong, including one night 
in September where several Ruff Puff platoons defected to 
the enemy. In November, as the Americans attempted to set 
up defensive perimeters around their compound, Captain 
Haneke was in the process of moving a fifty-five gallon 
drum of aviation fuel with a phosphorus grenade the 
Americans had set up when a Viet Cong sniper detonated 
 
1 U.S. Army Survival Manual FM 21-76. US Department of the Army. 
June 1992. 
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the drum and sent Haneke flying eighty feet across the field 
into a barbed wire fence smashing his jaw and cutting his 
carotid artery.2 
Captain Haneke miraculously survived the 
explosion despite losing an eye, half his leg, a foot, and 
having his skull crushed.3 While medical evacuation during 
the American Vietnam conflict was incredibly effective, 
much of the war’s execution was not. Why was Haneke, an 
Army officer, serving as an advisor to a regional police 
force? Instead of policing and intelligence gathering in the 
rural areas like a constabulary police force, Haneke and his 
team were teaching them infantry and survival tactics. 
While Captain Haneke’s Vietnam service was over, the 
American war continued for another seven years. 
Unfortunately, with the decades of neglect and 
mismanagement of South Vietnamese policing during the 
Vietnam war, many of these experiences were too common. 
*** 
The history of the American experience in Vietnam 
has chronicled many experiences like Haneke’s. With 
scores of young patriotic men injured or killed for few 
results, writers began to launch stinging critiques against 
Vietnam before the war had even ended. Just after 
Haneke’s horrific wounds, David Halberstam wrote The 
Best and the Brightest, a stinging rebuke of the Vietnam 
war policies and strategy of President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and his administration. Halberstam blames the 
disastrous war on LBJ’s micromanagement, Secretary of 
State Robert McNamara’s absurd metrics of “casualty 
 
2 Atkinson, Richard. The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of 
West Point’s Class of 1966. (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 
1989): 333-334. 
3 Komp, Catherine. Interview with Bill Haneke. Vietnam: Virginia 
Remembers. 28 September 2017. 
https://vpm.org/news/articles/2749/veterans-survival-in-vietnam-
inspires-lifetime-of-healing-and-hope 
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count,” and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam 
(MAC-V) Commanding General William Westmoreland’s 
inappropriate deployment of forces. Halberstam and his 
fellow “Orthodox” historians contend the Americans effort 
to defeat the North Vietnamese Communist Forces was 
inevitably doomed.4 
While other Orthodox historians of the war 
identified compelling and strong warfighters, there was no 
change to their argument of the impossibility of American 
success. Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul 
Vann and America in Vietnam tells the story of enigmatic 
heroes like John Paul Vann, and his successful fighting in 
Vietnam. Sheehan, like Halberstam, had been a Saigon 
reporter in the early 60s, and saw years of disastrous 
American defeat. Despite heroic Americans like Vann, 
poor American leadership and corrupt South Vietnamese 
governance ensured American involvement sealed 
America’s fate. 5 
Later historians began to differentiate the successful 
warfighting of President Richard Nixon’s administration 
from the Johnson failures. With new MAC-V commander, 
General Creighton Abrams, the American fight became 
more coordinated, and as a result accomplished many of its 
objectives. Lewis Sorley highlights Abrams’s successes in 
his 1999 A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and 
Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Sorley’s 
 
4 Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. (New York: Random 
House, 1969). 
Other Orthodox histories include:  
Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the 
Americans in Vietnam. (New York: Little Brown & Company, 1972). 
Prados, John. Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975. 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
5 Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in 
Vietnam, (Vintage, 1989). 
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work falls squarely into a new group of Vietnam historians. 
Sorley and other “Revisionists” argue that if the Americans 
had conducted the war better like Abrams and his team did, 
then Vietnam could have been a winnable war. 6 
Another conflict that has been compared to Vietnam 
is the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), in which the 
British defeated a Communist insurgent population in the 
colony. Military historians have asked for many years why 
the collapsing British Empire could successfully defeat a 
Communist insurgency in the jungles of Southeast Asia, 
but the much larger American army could not. As the 21st 
century War on Terror continued, a new focus on 
counterinsurgency warfare began which caused scholars to 
analyze past conflicts like Vietnam and compare them to 
Malaya.  
In this scholarship, a forgotten British officer has 
come to the forefront. Sir Robert Thompson (1917-1992) 
was a Royal Air Force officer in World War II, and also 
served as a senior Colonial officer in the Malayan 
Emergency. Thompson was credited with executing the 
successful British counterinsurgency strategy that defeated 
Chin Peng’s Communist Malayan National Liberation 
Army (MNLA). Because of his success defeating 
Communists in Malaya, the British government sent 
Thompson to Vietnam in 1961 as part of the British 
Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to assist the Americans and 
 
6 Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final 
Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, (New York: Harcourt, 
1999).  
Other Revisionist histories include: 
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978). 
Summers, Harry. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.  
(New York: Presidio Press, 1982). 
Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War 1954-1965. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Thompson 
was sent to advise his government’s counterinsurgency 
fight against the Communist forces that had already 
infiltrated South Vietnam as the insurgent Viet Cong. 
Thompson advised the South Vietnamese government until 
the November 1963 coup that killed Diem.7 Afterwards, 
Thompson wrote several books on his experience, most 
notably the trilogy on his doctrine for defeating Communist 
insurgencies. In Defeating Communist Insurgency: The 
Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, Thompson gives his 
explanation for the British and Malayan people’s success in 
defeating Chin Peng’s communists, and his assessment of 
the early American advisory experience he observed.8 
Thompson’s follow up book, No Exit from Vietnam gives 
his insights into what he considers American missteps in 
Vietnam, and offers his specific suggestions as to how to 
defeat the North Vietnamese insurgency.9 His third book, 
Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-196910 takes a 
global look at all the battles against Communist insurgents, 
and potential future stratagems to defeat global 
Communism in the Cold War. 
No Exit from Vietnam piqued the interest of 
President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger. They invited Thompson to Washington 
DC to discuss the book, and then invited him to travel to 
Vietnam to give Nixon and the team his assessment of the 
current strategy and how to improve it. 
 
7 Thompson, Robert. Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern 
Wars. (London: Leo Cooper, 1989): 122. 
8 Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 
Malaya and Vietnam. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). 
9 Thompson, Robert. No Exit from Vietnam. (New York: David McKay 
Company, 1970). 
10 Thompson, Robert. Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-
1969. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1970). 
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The scholarship around Thompson tends to identify 
how well the United States fared using Thompson’s 
warfighting and political strategies. For instance, George 
M. Brooke III’s two-volume doctoral dissertation, “A 
Matter of Will: Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya, and the 
Failure of American Strategy in Vietnam,” examines the 
South Vietnamese and American’s poor execution of 
Thompson’s hamlet relocation strategy (which Thompson 
considered a key success in Malaya) and America lacking 
the Thompsonian “will” to continue the fight.11 
What the scholarship on Thompson continually 
misses, however, is what Thompson himself considered the 
key to defeating the insurgency. In Defeating Communist 
Insurgency, Thompson identifies the Malay colonial police 
as the key to defeating the Communists. The police far 
outnumbered the British and Malay army forces. Even at 
the height of the Emergency, the British only had twenty 
thousand soldiers fighting in Malaya. The vast majority of 
the patrolling and warfighting was conducted by the 
police.12 
This type of police is quite different than an 
American concept, however. In empires like the British or 
French, the “police” had a constabulary paramilitary role. A 
constabulary police force’s mission was to protect the local 
population and stop unrest or possibly insurrection. As 
colonial powers were outnumbered compared to a local 
population, the constabulary was comprised mostly of 
native constables with some colonial leadership. A 
constabulary unit would gather intelligence from the local 
population and would conduct patrols and even get into 
firefights. The most important weapon the constabulary 
had, however, was its power to arrest. Acting on 
 
11 Brooke, George. “A Matter of Will: Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya, 
and the Failure of American Strategy in Vietnam.” PhD. diss. 
(Georgetown University, 2004). 
12 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 47-48.  
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intelligence, a constabulary could conduct a raid, arrest 
insurrectionist supporters, and separate them from further 
influence on a village. These ideas and techniques are not 
civilian policing nor are they infantry tactics. This 
paramilitary style organization is unique to imperial 
policing.13  
The continuing question for Vietnam historians is 
why were the Americans ultimately unsuccessful in 
defeating the North Vietnamese Communist insurgency? 
While the Orthodox, Revisionist, and Thompsonians have 
their theories, they fail to understand that the failure was 
not because of military strategies, but instead the American 
lack of understanding of what a constabulary police force 
was. Even though Vietnam was a former French colony, 
the drastic upheaval from World War II, and a rushed 
transition to independence from France destroyed the years 
of colonial policing knowledge. Afterwards, the ignorance 
of constabulary policing from the United States 
exacerbated the problems with Vietnam policing and 
misguided training. Finally, a critical misunderstanding 
between the Americans and Thompson himself made the 
Vietnam police force useless for its critical mission which 
ultimately doomed the American and South Vietnamese 
mission. 
*** 
On the morning of the 9th of March 1945, the Vichy French 
Colonial forces, which prior to this moment had a relatively 
peaceful World War II experience, awakened to a 
nightmare. After France surrendered to Germany in 1940, 
the new Vichy government still administered its colonies. 
French Indochina, which the French controlled for almost a 
 
13 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 19, 85.   
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century, continued as it had prior to the war with one 
exception. Its new “ally,” the Empire of Japan, was able to 
garrison its forces there and use its ports. All of this 
changed as Germany went into full retreat in Europe. 
Japan, in an effort to keep the offensive against the allies, 
executed “Operation Bright Moon.” They immediately 
surrounded and captured all French administrators and 
military to take full control of Indochina. Fifteen-thousand 
French and Indochinese soldiers and Gendarmerie 
(France’s colonial police force) were captured. The 
Japanese tortured and beheaded almost a third of its 
prisoners. Without weapons or reinforcements from France, 
those who escaped had to traverse hundreds of miles of 
jungle and mountains to reach China. As French diplomat 
Jean Sainteny lamented years later in retrospect, “[The 
coup] wrecked a colonial enterprise that had been in 
existence for 80 years.”14  
*** 
French Indochina 
Prior to South Vietnam’s formation, the French 
gained control of Indochina in a series of battles that by 
1893 gave them Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchina, Cambodia, 
and Laos. During this time France administrated these 
independent protectorates through local kings or emperors. 
After the March 1945 coup, however, the Japanese created 
the “independent” Empire of Vietnam (Annam, Tonkin, 
Cochinchina), Kingdom of Kampuchea (Cambodia), and 
the Kingdom of Luang Phrabang (Laos). 15  
With the coup, the Japanese destroyed all of the 
French colonial infrastructure, most notably the 
Gendarmerie. These forces, commanded by the French, but 
 
14 Chandler, David. “Legacies of World War II in Indochina.” Legacies 
of World War II in South and East Asia. Edited by David Koh Wee 
Hock, (Institute of South East Asia Studies, 2007): 24. 
15 Ibid, 27. 
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mostly comprising local populations, provided protection 
for the local population through policing. Most importantly, 
as Sir Robert Thompson stressed, it acted as the first line of 
defense against native population insurrections.16 With 
these vital groups gone, Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) and his 
Viet Minh independence movement took advantage of their 
previous American support from the Office of Strategic 
Services and the weak emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, to 
declare independence. With the Japanese defeat and retreat 
from Indochina, however, France was determined to 
reclaim its colony.  
France did not return to their colony status quo 
antebellum, however. All of the administrative state and 
police forces had been murdered or forced to flee. Their 
defeat at the hands of the Japanese also created a perception 
of French weakness amongst the populace. As French 
academic, Paul Mus, who escaped from Hanoi at the launch 
of the coup remarked, “French Colonialism had been blown 
out of history.”17 No longer were the French seen as 
invincible. As the French attempted to put Bao Dai in 
charge of Vietnam again, Ho and the Viet Minh expanded 
their insurrection movement. The hastily rebuilt French 
colonial administration could not prevent Ho’s movement 
from growing in popularity amongst the population. With 
the Haiphong incident, war began between Ho’s forces and 
the French and South Vietnamese forces.18  
As the French searched for a way to preserve their 
influence in Indochina, they quickly worked to gain favor 
with the loyal Vietnamese forces as well as mollify the 
Americans (who were financially supporting the French 
war effort) and their anti-colonial sentiment. France signed 
 
16 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 85. 
17 Chandler, 26. 
18 Ibid, 35. 
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the Elysée Accords in 1949 with South Vietnam. This 
agreement gave increased autonomy to the Vietnamese for 
self-rule. While this limited autonomy was unpopular with 
the Vietnamese, the one overlooked but critical issue was 
that the former colonial police forces were disbanded and 
replaced by a South Vietnamese controlled Civil Guard.19  
The difference between British and French actions 
in 1949 could not have been more disparate. In Malaya, Sir 
Robert Thompson and the British forces were investing 
training and energy in the Malayan colonial police 
preparing it to suppress the growing Communist threat. 
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the French completely 
dismantled its Gendarmerie. Perhaps from the weakened 
administrative state from the coup, France ignored its 
previous success in suppressing insurrections in its other 
colonies like Algeria. Regardless of the reason, the result 
was catastrophic. Vietnam being forced to police itself 
ultimately impaired its ability to govern. After a few years, 
it became clear South Vietnam needed a functioning police 
force, and it certainly seemed logical for the country that 
was funding the war to provide this training. In 1955, the 
U.S. Vietnam policing experience began. 
*** 
U.S. Army Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, the 
commander of Military Assistance Advisory Group 
Vietnam (MAAG-V) was apoplectic. “Whoever sold Diem 
this idea is nuts!” he wrote to a colleague.20 President Ngo 
Dinh Diem, South Vietnam’s President wanted the new 
Civil Guard to be comprised not only of 55,000 troops, but 
also tanks and helicopters for “subduing riots” or to 
 
19 Spector, Ronald H. The United States Army in Vietnam. Advice and 
Support: The Early Years 1941-1960. (Washington DC: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1985): 94. 
20 Letter, Williams to Lansdale, 1 Mar 1958; Memo of Conversations, 
Williams, Barrows, President Diem, 3 Dec 1957, Williams Papers. 
Cited in Spector. 
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“disperse a mob.”21 When a Vietnamese general was tasked 
with drawing up the plan for this newly reorganized Civil 
Guard, he simply copied U.S. Army task organizations he 
found. This plan of Diem’s was completely different from 
the one State Department Vietnam mission leader Leland 
Barrows and his team had devised a few years earlier. 
General Williams and the rest of the MAAG group 
assumed Diem was attempting to create his own private 
army.22 
*** 
The U.S. Policing Effort 
 After the Elysée accords, the vestiges of the French 
colonial forces continued in little more than name. There 
were 54,000 men in the Civil Guard, which was the 
paramilitary colonial style police force, 7000 in the 
municipal police, and 3500 in what was called the 
“Vietnam Bureau of Investigation.” No one had any idea 
how many Gendarmerie there actually were or if they were 
part of the Civil Guard numbers. There was also a “Self 
Defense Corps” originally designed as a reserve police 
force that had 50,000 members.23 What these units had in 
numbers, they completely lacked in training and 
equipment. Most of the Self Defense Corps was without 
weapons, and what weapons they had were antiquated 
French rifles with little ammunition.  
While the lack of equipment was troubling, the 
incoherence of the organization was the most problematic. 
 
21 Memo of Conversations, President Diem, Ambassador Durbrow, 
Barrows, Gen Williams, Chan, 5 Mar 1958, Williams Papers. Cited in 
Spector. 
22 Spector, 324-325. 
23 Ibid, 320. 
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A seasoned officer with colonial experience, like Sir Robert 
Thompson, probably would have recognized the vestiges of 
an old colonial police force. At this time, unfortunately, 
Thompson was fighting Chin Peng and the Malay 
Communists. One negative of the American anticolonial 
ethos was that this constabulary-type structure made little 
sense to Americans. In 1955, after the French had signed 
the Geneva Accords and left Indochina, Lieutenant General 
Williams and his MAAGV team focused their advisory and 
financial support away from the French and directly 
towards the newly independent Republic of Vietnam’s 
(South Vietnam) government and military affairs. 
Williams’s priority was preparing the South Vietnamese 
Army (ARVN) for what many feared was the impending 
attack across the 17th parallel by the North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA). As the Korean War ended only three years 
earlier, the Americans were convinced that with the 
establishment of the divided Vietnams, any Communist 
attack would be a conventional attack south. With Williams 
and Diem focused on building up the conventional ARVN 
forces (building up to seven divisions), there was a debate 
regarding the police.24 With Williams focused on building 
up the Army, the police building was left to the State 
Department’s Leland Barrows and his Mission to 
Vietnam.25 
Leland Burrows was a career government official 
who had previously served the Truman administration. 
From 1949-1958, he led the U.S. Mission to Vietnam. 26 
The Mission’s role was to advise and build the 
infrastructure of Diem’s new independent government. 
When it came to the police force, there was some debate as 
to who would rebuild the current forces. Barrows and the 
 
24 Spector, 19. 
25 Wilson, Theodore A. Interview with Leland Barrows. Harry S 
Truman Library & Museum, January 8, 1971. 
26 Ibid. 
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American team insisted that the police forces needed to be 
organized under the Ministry of the Interior, not the 
Ministry of Defense.27 Most likely, American distaste for 
colonial rule and the current intense Gendarmerie fighting 
in French Algeria led the Americans to insist on a more 
civilian focused form of policing. In 1955, Barrows sent a 
police advisory group to South Vietnam from Michigan 
State University.  
The Michigan State team established a national 
police training academy and basic structure to the new 
Civil Guard. From 1949 to 1958, Barrows led the U.S. 
Mission to Vietnam. Instead of Thompsonian paramilitary 
tactics and intelligence gathering like the kind deployed by 
the Malayan Colonial Police, the Civil Guard was trained to 
operate like “The Pennsylvania State Police.”28 Williams 
was skeptical of Barrows’s strategy and described them as, 
“Police types who do not see the big picture.”29 Diem was 
also critical of the new Civil Guard organization. Being a 
civilian style police force was the last thing a volatile new 
country like South Vietnam needed. He vehemently stated 
to the Americans that Vietnam was “not Michigan.” 30 
If Diem or Williams had somehow wrestled police 
control from Barrows, there is little evidence that the 
Vietnamese police would have been dramatically 
transformed into a Thompsonian-style constabulary police 
force. While Diem and General Williams saw the natural 
complement of the Civil Guard to the Defense Ministry, 
they did not envision a true paramilitary force. Williams 
simply saw armed forces as military units. Barrows’s 
 
27 Spector, 322.   
28 Ibid, 321. 
29 Memo of Conversations, Williams with Diem, 3 Dec 1957, Williams 
Papers. 
30 Spector, 322. 
14  Spring 2021 
 
Michigan team envisioned an American police force. 
Neither could comprehend the organization as a 
constabulary force. They simply did not understand the 
principles of constabulary fighting that Sir Robert 
Thompson stressed. 
There is some revisionist discussion that U.S. Air 
Force Colonel Edward Lansdale advocated for a 
“counterinsurgency force” to defeat an insurrection in the 
South.31 Lansdale, who had worked in Vietnam as a French 
advisor and CIA operative, had made many claims 
criticizing the French bombings as well as the overall 
MAAG strategies. His charges are not consistent with the 
facts, however. Lansdale claimed that counterinsurgency 
was not known during this time (ignoring Thompson and 
the Malayan Emergency). Thompson made no mention of 
Lansdale’s work in Vietnam, nor are there any documents 
suggesting there was an alternate plan to the Michigan 
State team that was considered. As later historic 
scholarship determined, the Michigan State team was also 
comprised of CIA personnel. The lack of coordination of 
policing strategies with Lansdale seems unlikely.32 
As the insurgency inside South Vietnam intensified, 
American and South Vietnamese policy makers realized 
that an impending North Vietnamese assault across the 17th 
parallel was not likely. The Viet Cong Communist 
insurgency was the largest threat to the South Vietnamese 
government. After the Geneva Accords in 1954, most 
Catholics and other non-Communist supporters of Diem 
moved into South Vietnam. Ho’s Viet Minh supporters in 
the South, however, did not move North. The southern 
Communists formed the Viet Cong forces to conduct 
guerilla operations. With this new threat, Americans 
 
31 Williams, Kenneth H. The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia and the 
Vietnam War: A Narrative Chronology.  (Washington DC: Air Force 
History and Museums Program, 2019): 193.  
32 Hinkle, Warren, Robert Scheer, and Sol Stern. “The University on 
the Make (or How MSU helped Madame Nhu).” Ramparts, April 1966. 
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repurposed the Civil Guard. The Barrows initiative of 
civilian policing was abandoned. This adjustment, 
however, proved just as ineffective. 
To create a force to defeat the Viet Cong, the Civil 
Guard and the Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) were 
combined into a large force in 1959. Diem’s desire for a 
private army might have been unrealistic, but it was not 
without merit. During this Civil Guard transition, Diem was 
overthrown in 1963 and killed. After the coup, the new 
Civil Guard was turned into the Regional Forces. The 
ineffective and ill-equipped Self Defense Guard became the 
Popular Forces. These two groups were combined into one 
chain of command for the RFPF. Nicknamed “Ruff Puffs” 
by the Americans, their mission was to fight the Viet Cong 
in rural areas. 
With the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, the 
American effort in Vietnam escalated. MAAG became 
MAC-V, and its new commander General William 
Westmoreland led the effort in the fight against the North 
Vietnamese. Americans began to deploy the Ruff Puffs in 
insurgent campaigns against the Viet Cong. After the failed 
Barrows civilian plan, and having total ignorance of 
colonial police tactics, the Americans used the Ruff Puffs 
like any other infantry unit. Instead of constabulary experts 
like Thompson, Captain Haneke and other Infantry officers 
were assigned to train them. These units conducted infantry 
patrols and learned infantry tactics from the American 
advisors. With no experience in constabulary-type work, 
the Americans trained the Ruff Puffs in what they knew: 
infantry tactics. While the Ruff Puffs were still separate 
from the ARVN organization, the manner by which they 
differed in mission from the ARVN or the U.S. Army was a 
distinction without a difference. 
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Besides the Americans’ inability to train 
paramilitary forces, there was another systemic issue with 
the Ruff Puffs. Because of Diem and General Williams’s 
priority to defend South Vietnam from a Korean war-style 
attack across the DMZ, all of South Vietnam’s best men 
joined the army.33 The civilian ministries and police forces 
received the second-tier men, and units could not avoid 
Communist infiltration. After years of disappointing results 
and an inability to pacify the South’s rural areas, the Ruff 
Puffs were combined into the ARVN organization in 
1970.34 
Whether creating a Michigan police force, or a 
group of mediocre infantrymen, there was little chance of 
success for creating a true Thompsonian counterinsurgency 
force. Both the MAAG-V and State Department Mission 
had no comprehension of what the French colonial forces 
provided as the system had been dismantled years before. 
Diem’s ideas of a more militaristic guard, ideas probably 
poorly translated from Thompson, were met with suspicion 
and lack of understanding. The binary decisions of civilian 
or military for the police forces provided no flexibility, 
which was essential in disrupting the counterinsurgency. 
The American anticolonial tradition and lack of 
constabulary forces simply did not allow the Americans a 
chance at success. 
*** 
Sir Robert Thompson had been advising and observing 
American actions in Vietnam for several years. Thompson 
was fascinated by American strategies in South Vietnam 
and how they did not result in success. As he stressed the 
 
33 Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam, 111. 
34 Clarke, Jeffrey. United States Army in Vietnam.  Advice and Support: 
The Final Years 1965-1973. (Washington DC: Center of Military 
History, United States Army, 1988): 37. 
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need for intelligence, one general remarked to him, “Let’s 
go out and kill some Viet Cong, and then we can worry 
about intelligence!”35 The Americans were not afraid to try 
new things and spend money. Expenditures in Vietnam 
were over ten times what the British spent in Malaya. Yet 
the results were not leading to success. This reality finally 
led to Sir Robert Thompson’s infamous charge: “The 
trouble with you Americans is that whenever you double 
the effort you somehow manage to square the error.” 36 
*** 
Sir Robert Thompson 
Sir Robert Thompson began his career in the Royal 
Air Force at Cambridge and was commissioned as a 
Reserve officer in 1936. As he studied and prepared for the 
impending war with Germany, he chose a career in the 
Colonial Service which required an extra year of schooling 
at Oxford. The Colonial Service assigned young Robert 
Thompson to the British colony of Malaya. He was then 
sent to Macao, a Portuguese colony, to learn Cantonese. As 
the British began fighting Germany in 1940, Thompson and 
other Colonial Service students were to continue their 
Chinese studies in Hong Kong. As Japanese bombers began 
attacking Hong Kong on December 8th, Pearl Harbor was 
attacked simultaneously on the other side of the dateline. 
The British war now had a second front in the Pacific.37 
With some beginning Cantonese proficiency, and travel 
passes signed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 
Thompson and other cadets were forced to evade and fight 
their way into mainland China. After connecting with 
 
35 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 85. 
36 Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam. 89. 
37 Thompson, Make for the Hills, 1-2. 
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Chinese guerrilla and former Hong Kong police forces, 
Thompson was able to join the Chindit operations as a 
Royal Air Force officer serving under legendary British 
officer Orde Wingate. Thompson participated in Burma’s 
irregular operations and was an instrumental part of the 
Chindit team that helped disrupt Japanese operations in 
Burma. 38  
After World War II, Thompson resumed his 
Colonial Services career in Malaya. During the war, the 
Japanese occupied Malaya. The Chinese Malayans, along 
with some British fighters, spent the war fighting the 
Japanese in the jungles. The Chinese formed the Malayan 
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to defeat the 
Japanese, and after the war, the British reestablished their 
colonial rule over Malaya. Despite the disarming and 
disbanding of the MPAJA, many Chinese Malayans, 
inspired by Mao Zedong’s Communist movement were 
motivated to rebel against British rule. The MPAJA’s 
wartime leader, Chin Peng, took control of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) and began violent attacks against 
Malays and British residents. In 1948, after the murders of 
several rubber plantation European managers, the British 
Malay government declared a State of Emergency, and the 
12-year conflict known as The Malayan Emergency 
officially began.39 
The MCP successfully attacked key British targets, 
and even assassinated the Malayan High Commissioner 
Henry Gurney. Ultimately, the British were able to defeat 
the insurgency through the leadership of General Sir Gerald 
Templer. Thompson, who had worked implementing the 
counterinsurgency strategy, cataloged all of the successful 
key metrics the British achieved. By 1960, the MCP had 
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surrendered, and the Malayan Emergency was an 
impressive victory in counterinsurgency for Great Britain.40  
Thompson detailed the important factors that led to 
the success of the British counterinsurgency, many of 
which were surprising to conventional military strategists. 
For instance, he argued that the guerilla fighters were not 
the important factor to defeat in a counterinsurgency. 
Instead, determining and interrupting the underground 
networks of the population was paramount.41 To achieve 
this goal, Thompson stressed gaining proper intelligence. 
He also determined that the key fighters in Malaya were the 
police force, not the military. When the Malay police 
would patrol an area and gather intelligence on potential 
MCP insurgents, the police could then arrest those 
individuals. While removing an insurgent from battle was 
effective, the more important achievement, Thompson 
argued, was keeping the local population safe from 
violence. With a minimal British troop deployment, they 
were able to determine when they wanted to engage the 
MCP and did not aimlessly meander through the jungle 
searching for the enemy. With their proper intelligence and 
patrols gathered from the Malay police, British patrols 
pushed the MCP away from the rural population 
eliminating opportunities for Communists to gain rural 
control.42 
Another important strategy Thompson noted, was 
the concentration of friendly forces. Rural villages away 
from police support were targets for the MCP. Thompson 
and the British created a strategy of moving entire villages 
into more protected areas. While this tactic seemed 
extreme, most villages were only moved around three miles 
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from their previous location, and the new areas were 
concentrated together for better police protection.43 An 
additional strategy that Thompson considered important, 
was the targeting of key insurgent infrastructure by 
ambushing supply routes. For Thompson, preventing 
insurgent resupply missions was more important than 
winning any insurgent battle.44 
Arguably the most important point in 
counterinsurgency, Thompson stressed, was patience. The 
insurgents had to understand that the government forces 
were not going to leave quickly. In Malaya, Thompson 
noted that the British resolve brought Chin Peng to the 
negotiating table with the government. When Chin Peng 
realized the British, and after 1958, the independent Malay 
government, were not going to stop their counterinsurgency 
campaign, the Emergency ended with the MCP’s defeat.45 
Because of Thompson’s success in Malaya, British Prime 
Minister Harold MacMillan sent Thompson and the 
BRIAM team to South Vietnam as an advisor to President 
Diem and the Americans.46 Thompson’s counsel should 
have been a perfect complement to the fiercely anti-
Communist Diem and the well-funded and equipped U.S. 
military.  
When Thompson began to advise the South 
Vietnamese government, he attempted to implement the 
hamlet resettlement plan for Diem’s government. Despite 
his advice, it was a disaster. Rather than concentrating 
villages and only slightly moving them, the Diem 
government moved hamlets far away from their previous 
locations and also spread them too far from each other.47 
By ignoring the key parts of the Thompson strategy 
(concentrating friendly hamlets, and keeping villages near 
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their original location), the South Vietnamese made the 
villagers less safe and impossible to patrol. Another unique 
issue to Vietnam compared to Malaya was Vietnam’s lack 
of political stability. Despite the American financial and 
political support, Diem’s regime grew less effective and 
ultimately was overthrown in 1963. The Americans took 
over responsibility of the Vietnam war in 1964, and the 
BRIAM team returned to England.48 
With the Americans in command of the war effort, 
Thompson’s concern about “squaring the error” became 
reality. Hamlet resettlements were even more haphazard 
and spread out when done by the US Marines.49 Instead of 
having a light footprint of foreign troops like the British in 
Malaya, Americans deployed over 200,000 Americans to 
fight the Vietnamese communists. Having no constabulary 
intelligence gathering like Thompson had stressed, the 
Americans instead implemented a “search and destroy” 
strategy which simply allowed the NVA to choose where 
and when to fight.50 By 1968, the Americans were in an 
endless war of attrition on the ground supported in the air 
by a largely ineffective bombing campaign. 
After General Creighton Abrams became 
commander of MAC-V in June 1968, the American 
strategy changed dramatically. As new ambassador to 
South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker noted that instead of 
discussing the “political war” or “air war,” there became 
“one war.” The Barrows/Stewart fights from the 1950s 
were over.51 The larger “search and destroy” missions were 
replaced with an emphasis on holding territory. Thompson, 
noting the changes from England, wrote his book No Exit 
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from Vietnam celebrating the new Abrams strategy. This 
book attracted the attention of the new Nixon 
administration National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. 
Kissinger, impressed with Thompson’s success in Malaya 
defeating Communists, invited him to Washington to 
discuss the U.S. strategy.52 After the meeting, Thompson 
was invited to further meetings regarding Vietnam 
withdrawals. He was also invited to tour Vietnam and give 
his assessment on the ground. 
Sir Robert Thompson assembled a team of advisors 
and travelled to Vietnam in February and March of 1971 to 
give his assessment of the American war effort. It is 
noteworthy that Thompson on his trip to Vietnam did not 
bring other British soldiers. Instead, he brought his 
colleagues from Malaya who administered the winning 
police force work. Sir Richard Catling, W. L. R. Carbonell, 
J. H. Hindmarsh, and D. S. Palmer were all experts and 
leaders in British Colonial policing who were part of the 
Malayan police force during the Emergency. After the trip, 
Thompson and his team produced a detailed report on what 
would be needed for the South Vietnamese to be successful 
in Vietnam. His focus was on reforming the National 
Police.53  
In Thompson’s March 1971 Report on the National 
Police Republic of Vietnam, Thompson evaluated the state 
of the National Police and offered 157 specific suggestions 
for reforms. What Thompson and his team most identified 
was the National Police’s intelligence gathering failure.54 In 
Malaya, Thompson noted the police were the main 
intelligence gatherers. It was imperative that the police 
could identify insurgent supporters, arrest, and remove 
them from the population. Thompson proposed a regional 
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police control reorganization to ensure they patrolled the 
rural areas properly to keep insurgents away from the 
hamlets. Interestingly, in the National Police history, 
Thompson ignored all of the Michigan State work, and only 
briefly discussed the original French organization.55 He 
gave specific instructions for how the Police should assist 
the Armed Forces and gather “intelligence related to 
subversion and terrorism.”56 
For as much of an expert as Thompson was in 
counterinsurgency, it is noteworthy that he did not relate 
how much the former French Indochina colonial police 
force had strayed from its original mission. He only briefly 
mentioned the “administrative and training problems” that 
the force faced.57 Perhaps it was an effort not to upset the 
Americans as he was only an invited guest. He worked hard 
to ingratiate himself to Abrams by dining and creating a 
personal relationship with him before offering his criticism, 
so he may have seen no need to discuss in detail the 
previous American folly.58 
The report was analyzed by the Americans. A 
month later (April 1971), Ellsworth Bunker and the State 
Department team provided a detailed response to 
Thompson’s report.59 Bunker’s memo evaluated the report 
based on several priorities of timing and feasibility: 
A: Is and should be implemented 
B: Is and should be implemented in part 
C: Should be implemented 
D: Should be implemented, but infeasible 
E: Should not be implemented 
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As well as four different categories for timing of 
implementation: 1) Currently, 2) Short Term (Within one 
year), 3) Mid Term (Over one year), and 4) 
Indeterminant.60 Items 15-36 of Thompson’s suggestions, 
which related directly to the police strategic 
recommendation for patrolling and intelligence gathering 
for the war effort, were grouped together, and rated with a 
very optimistic “B” and “Short Term.” The comments, 
however, suggested a less optimistic tone: 
“These organizational concepts reflect British 
Colonial influences. They do not adequately 
consider the background of Vietnamese concepts, 
the residue of French Colonial influence, and 
approximately 15 years of U.S. influence on police 
matters.”61 
In a few sentences of bureaucratic jargon, the 
American Vietnam War was perfectly encapsulated. An 
assembly line of errors had been created: First, the French 
abandoned Vietnam and left behind a dysfunctional 
colonial police force, then the Americans attempted to 
create something unnecessary and not adaptable to the 
country, followed by an advisor missing the fundamental 
problems. Thompson repeatedly touted the Malayan police 
as the key to defeating the MCP, yet years later he never 
mentioned the American and South Vietnamese failure in 
the police development.62  
Both the Orthodox and Revisionist schools have 
filled volumes in libraries criticizing American mistakes in 
Vietnam. Whether on policy or strategic level, finding 
errors in judgement or execution has never been difficult. 
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Sorley and the Revisionist school have emphasized the 
successes of the American war in Vietnam after 1968 and 
suggested that if the Abrams strategy had been pursued 
more consistently, they could have prevailed in the conflict. 
Attempting to understand which ignored plan or strategy 
might have produced better results, or which advisor or 
strategy should not have been ignored is a perpetual 
challenge. For every Sir Robert Thompson, who advised 
two governments and had successfully executed a 
counterinsurgency strategy, there are others like Colonel 
Edward Lansdale who claim they were the vox clematis 
despite having limited experience in counterinsurgency 
warfare. For any losing effort, there is no shortage of 
people who retrospectively had the solution. 
Sir Robert Thompson is different, however. He had 
successfully defeated a Communist insurgency. He had 
tangible plans and results that winning governments could 
follow to defeat an enemy. His scholarship on 
counterinsurgency and five principles for success against 
an insurgency are still studied today.63 British military 
historian Alexander Alderson recently evaluated the British 
strategies in Iraq using Thompsonian doctrine to measure 
efficacy.64 Other Vietnam scholarship measures the 
efficacy of hamlet resettlement or political will. There is no 
question that the Thompsonian school will continue to 
flourish. Thompson was prolific in writing doctrine, was 
willing to share his ideas, and had no specific axes to grind. 
As a foreign advisor and not a member of the South 
Vietnamese or U.S. governments, his voice remains one of 
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the most objective regarding evaluation of the Vietnam war 
effort. 
Clearly, Thompson is not without fault regarding 
Vietnam strategy, however. His assessment of the 
contemporary state of the police force did not directly 
address the use of the police as infantry units which he 
specifically criticized in Defeating Communist 
Insurgency.65 Thompson brought an entire team of colonial 
police experts to South Vietnam to evaluate the National 
Police, yet he chose not to address the American 
dismantling of a constabulary model directly. After 
attempting to create an American-style police force, the 
Regional Forces had been trained and converted into 
infantry units. Americans simply saw the forces as a binary: 
a unit is either a military force or a civilian police force. 
Even the leader of the Territorial Forces General in 
Vietnam, General Ngo Quang Truong, considered the force 
he commanded a military force. In his 1981 after action 
report, he discussed military battles, and his report rarely 
mentioned any sort of policing. It reflected the total 
conversion from the Barrows or the previous gendarmerie 
model into an infantry unit.66  
Increased scholarship today notes the constabulary 
skills deficit in modern American peacekeeping. National 
security expert, Robert Perito discusses in Where is the 
Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a 
Postconflict Stability Force67 America’s need to create a 
Thompsonian-type constabulary force to ensure a 
previously hostile foreign country can be pacified after the 
fight. Thompson’s work will continue to be the framework 
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for governments and historians to determine the correct 
way to implement future peacekeeping strategies. 
Hopefully, this paper will create further scholarship 
regarding the breakdown of proper policing in Vietnam. 
Thompsonian scholarship continues to be an important area 
of focus on the Vietnam war, and in evaluating past and 
future counterinsurgency warfare. His principles establish 
an effective benchmark for evaluating this type of warfare. 
It is important, however, to not create a hagiographic 
portrayal of Thompson as regards his Vietnam advisory 
work. The failure to establish a proper constabulary police 
force was from a confluence of abandonment by the 
French, American misapplication of home-style policing, 
and the South Vietnamese being at the mercy of ineffective 
instruction. Thompson deserves criticism as well for not 
turning the focus of the counterinsurgency on proper 
deployment of the Vietnamese police. The casualties of 
these policing mistakes were monumental and tragic. 
Captain Haneke and many other misdirected soldiers were 
irrevocably hurt by this catastrophic strategic failure.  
Sir Robert Thompson addresses in his books that 
policing was the British key to success in the Malayan 
Emergency. If Thompson’s doctrine is the fundamental 
teachings for counterinsurgency warfare, as most scholars 
who have studied him argue, then the focus for Vietnam 
Thompsonian historians should be on the policing failures 
in the Vietnam war, and why Thompson himself seemed to 
ignore his own advice. Rather than using Thompson as 
merely a framework for counterinsurgency evaluation, 
military scholars should determine why the man who 
developed the doctrine of counterinsurgency decided to 
dismiss the central tenets in the years that followed. 
Constabulary policing in counterinsurgency is clearly not 
just infantry patrolling or peacekeeping. Until scholars 
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address the differences, future Vietnam scholarship may 
offer new theories on America’s failure, but these theories 
will continue to have distinctions without differences.  
